Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not barred by the prohibition against circumstantial use of character if such other crime, wrong, or act is offered to prove identity.

Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, pin? (1988) (defendant was charged with selling stolen goods; defendant denied he knew the goods were stolen; to rebut defendant's claim of lack of knowledge, government....Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is admissible if there is sufficient evidence to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the other crime, wrong, or act occurred. Clear and convincing evidence is unnecessary; "sufficient" means only that there must be enough evidence to make the other crime, wrong, or act relevant.

Fed. R. Evid. 803(8) ("Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by...An exception to the hearsay rule applies to the following records of government offices and agencies: (A) public records that set forth the activities of the government office or agency; (B) public records that set forth observations that a government office or agency was required to make and report but this exception does not apply in criminal cases to observations of police officers and other law enforcement personnel; or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and in criminal cases when offered against the government, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate the untrustworthiness of such findings.

Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 17 (1994) ("Finally, Sandoval objects to the portion of the charge in which the judge instructed the jury that a reasonable doubt is 'not a mere possible doubt.' The Cage instruction included an almost identical reference to 'not a mere possible doubt,' but we did not...The reasonable doubt that requires an acquittal is a reasonable doubt rather than a merely possible, speculative, conjectural, or fanciful doubt.