A thing or matter is sufficiently authenticated to be admissible in evidence if the authenticating evidence submitted to the trial court is sufficient -- strong enough -- to permit a reasonable jury or reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the proffered thing or matter is authentic, that the proffered thing or matter is what its proponent claims it is.

Cf. United States v. Nguyen, 465 F.3d 1128, 1131-1132 (9th Cir. 2006) (reversing conviction for willful failure to comply with the terms of a release under supervision agreement because the trial court erred in admitting into....There is a hearsay exception for evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused.

Devin v. DeTella, 101 F.3d 1206, 1208 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Petitioner argues that, because 'most authorities agree that the jury view is an important part of the trial which provides independent evidence,' the Constitution guarantees a right to be present at a jury view. The Court explicitly rejected this...maybe

United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, pin? (11th Cir. 1983).Background evidence is admissible even if it is technically irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 or a comparable State rule.