Exclusionary rules rooted in "collateral policy," in considerations other than truthfinding

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) ("An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little resemblance to....Whether a statement was made in a casual manner or, instead, in a formal way is a factor that bears on the characterization of a statement as "testimonial" or "non-testimonial" for purposes of the 6th Amendment right of confrontation: the more the statement verges toward formality and less casual it is, the more likely the statement will be classified as "testimonial" -- and vice-versa.

United States v. Davis, 181 F.3d 147, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (upholding trial court's admission of officer's redacted buy report as pretrial identification because in a case with similar facts, the court "affirmed the....A pretrial identification is exempt from the prohibition against hearsay evidence if the witness who made the identification testifies and is subject to cross-examination at the trial or hearing at which the identification is offered and if the witness who made the identification did so after perceiving the person whom he or she identified.

Fed. R. Evid. 1001(4) ("A 'duplicate' is a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements....A duplicate is a counterpart produced (a) from the same impression as the original; (b) from the same matrix; (c) by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures; (d) by mechanical or electronic re-recording; (e) by chemical reproduction; or (f) by equivalent techniques that accurately reproduce the original.