A criminal defendant's criminal propensity to commit cannot be used to show that defendant committed the crime or crimes for which he or she is on trial.

Luckie v. Ameritech Corp., 389 F.3d 708, 715-716 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding, in plaintiff employee's action against defendant employer for racials harassment and retaliation, that the two statements [about a conversation with....A statement is not hearsay if the statement is offered to show a person's belief or state of mind and the relevance of the person's belief or state of mind does not depend on the truth or falsity of the statement.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) ("A statement is not hearsay if-- ... (2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.").A statement by a co-conspirator of a party is not barred by the hearsay rule from being admitted against the party if the statement was made by the co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.

United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 898-899 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding trial court's admission of accused's prior acts where "the government had established [accused's] prior acts with evidence sufficient to support a finding by a preponderance that [accused] had in fact committed...A trial court can exclude evidence of another instance or instances of child molestation in a criminal trial for child molestation or child sex abuse if the trial court finds that the harm or potential harm of such evidence of another instance or instances of child molestation or sex abuse substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence. A trial court has this power even if the evidence of another instance or instances of child molestation or child sex abuse is made presumptively admissible by a rule such as Federal Rule of Evidence 414.