A pretrial identification is exempt from the hearsay rule only if the declarant -- the person making the pretrial identification -- testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination.

Cf. United States v. Roach, 590 F.2d 181, 185-186 (5th Cir. 1979) ("As to the necessity of a psychiatric examination, we have held that the district court has broad discretion in determining whether to order such examinations. United States v. Jackson, 576 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1978). Given the...It is possible that persons may be disqualified from serving as witnesses on grounds not expressly enumerated in codes of evidence or by general common law principles -- on unenumerated grounds such as age, illness, sensory defects, defects in intelligence, lack of understanding, inability to communicate, defects in memory, and inability to be truthful.

Fed. R. Evid. 103(d) advisory committee's note ("This wording of the plain error principle is from Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While judicial unwillingness to be constructed by mechanical breakdowns of the adversary system has been more pronounced in criminal cases, there is no scarcity of decisions to the same...An objection is unnecessary to preserve a claim of error and a trial court should exclude, on its own initiative, evidence offered against a criminal defendant or other disadvantaged party when admission of the evidence would be "plain error."

United States v. Hangrove, 508 F.3d 445, 448 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding trial court's admission of the Hicks-Veal tapes which did not violate defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause because "coconspirator....The right of confrontation guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution puts no constraints on the admissibility of nontestimonial hearsay statements; the federal constitutional right of confrontation does not apply to such statements.