A statement falls within the hearsay exception created by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) or a comparable State rule for excited utterances, only if the declarant (the maker of the statement) was under the stress of the startling event or condition when he or she made the statement that relates to that startling event or condition.

United States v. Silva, 380 F.3d 1018, 1019-1020 (7th Cir. 2004) (reversing convictions for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine because the district court erroneously overruled hearsay....Hearsay is a statement that (i) is made other than at the trial or proceeding at which it is offered and (ii) is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted by the maker of the statement, the declarant.

United States v. Weaver, 507 F.3d 178, 186-187 (3d Cir. 2007) (vacating trial court's order which erroneously excluded the September 4 conversation between a co-conspirator and her sister because the statements were made....A statement falls within the hearsay exemption for statements of co-conspirators only if the statement was made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Cf. United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 801 (5th Cir. 1979) (conviction for knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute and knowingly and intentionally distributing cocaine; on appeal court agreed with accused that trial court erred in rejecting certain business...In the absence of a conviction against a witness, it is generally impermissible to impeach the witness with extrinisic evidence of an act of the witness if the sole purpose of offering the other is to attack the truthfulness of the witness. Evidence is of an act is "extrinsic" if evidence of the impeaching act can be had only by having another witness give evidence of the impeaching act.