Cf. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 609, 631-632 (2003):
California has brought a criminal prosecution after expiration of the time periods set forth in previously applicable statutes of limitations. California has done so under the authority of a new law that (1) permits resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions, and (2) was itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had expired. We conclude that the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, ?? 10, cl. 1, bars application of this new law to the present case.
...
Third, the dissent emphasizes the harm that child molestation causes, a harm that "will plague the victim for a lifetime," and stresses the need to convict those who abuse children. Post, at 2471. ... In making its second argument, which denies the existence of significant reliance interests, the dissent ignores the potentially lengthy period of time (in this case, 22 years) during which the accused lacked notice that he might be prosecuted and during which he was unaware, for example, of any need to preserve evidence of innocence. See supra, at 2449. Memories fade, and witnesses can die or disappear. See supra, at 2452. Such problems can plague child abuse cases, where recollection after so many years may be uncertain, and "recovered" memories faulty, but may nonetheless lead to prosecutions that destroy families. See, e.g., Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and Its Potential Legal Implications, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 103, 103-104 (1998). Regardless, a constitutional principle must apply not only in child abuse cases, but in every criminal case. And, insofar as we can tell, the dissent's principle would permit the State to revive a prosecution for any kind of crime without any temporal limitation. ... As to the dissent's third argument, we agree that the State's interest in prosecuting child abuse cases is an important one. But there is also a predominating constitutional interest in forbidding the State to revive a long-forbidden prosecution. And to hold that such a law is ex post facto does not prevent the State from extending time limits for the prosecution of future offenses, or for prosecutions not yet time barred.
Posted in 2009 by Peter Tillers
Piper, August; Lillevik, Linda; Kritzer, Roxanne Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Vol 14(3), Aug 2008, 223-242.
Authors' Abstract:
Some courts in recent years have tarnished their credibility by willingly and blindly adopting the theory of repressed memory. Such acceptance can destroy the reputations of falsely accused individuals, and, by failing to pay due attention to scientific evidence, gives credence to pseudoscience and demeans the scientific method. This paper was written to inform judges and attorneys about the relevant evidence, which shows that: (a) the concepts of repressed and recovered memory are not generally accepted in the psychological and psychiatric community; (b) the studies cited to support these concepts reveal significant flaws; (c) much empirical evidence has been accumulated against the theory of repression; (d) the studies using the best methodology offer the least support for the repression hypothesis; and (e) there is no evidence that recovered memories accurately reveal the specifics of long-ago events. Repressed- and recovered-memory theory is not supported by science.
Posted in 2009 by Peter Tillers
This recently-published book may have a bearing on the debates over claims of repressed memory due to sexual molestation: Susan A. Clancy, The Trauma Myth: The Truth About the Sexual Abuse of Children--and its Aftermath (Basic Books, Jan. 5, 2010). Susan Clancy is an experimental psychologist who works or worked at Harvard University. See this Wikipedia squib: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Susan_Clancy.
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California has brought a criminal prosecution after expiration of the time periods set forth in previously applicable statutes of limitations. California has done so under the authority of a new law that (1) permits resurrection of otherwise time-barred criminal prosecutions, and (2) was itself enacted after pre-existing limitations periods had expired. We conclude that the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, Art. I, ?? 10, cl. 1, bars application of this new law to the present case.
...
Third, the dissent emphasizes the harm that child molestation causes, a harm that "will plague the victim for a lifetime," and stresses the need to convict those who abuse children. Post, at 2471. ... In making its second argument, which denies the existence of significant reliance interests, the dissent ignores the potentially lengthy period of time (in this case, 22 years) during which the accused lacked notice that he might be prosecuted and during which he was unaware, for example, of any need to preserve evidence of innocence. See supra, at 2449. Memories fade, and witnesses can die or disappear. See supra, at 2452. Such problems can plague child abuse cases, where recollection after so many years may be uncertain, and "recovered" memories faulty, but may nonetheless lead to prosecutions that destroy families. See, e.g., Holdsworth, Is It Repressed Memory with Delayed Recall or Is It False Memory Syndrome? The Controversy and Its Potential Legal Implications, 22 Law & Psychol. Rev. 103, 103-104 (1998). Regardless, a constitutional principle must apply not only in child abuse cases, but in every criminal case. And, insofar as we can tell, the dissent's principle would permit the State to revive a prosecution for any kind of crime without any temporal limitation. ... As to the dissent's third argument, we agree that the State's interest in prosecuting child abuse cases is an important one. But there is also a predominating constitutional interest in forbidding the State to revive a long-forbidden prosecution. And to hold that such a law is ex post facto does not prevent the State from extending time limits for the prosecution of future offenses, or for prosecutions not yet time barred.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law. Vol 14(3), Aug 2008, 223-242.
Authors' Abstract:
Some courts in recent years have tarnished their credibility by willingly and blindly adopting the theory of repressed memory. Such acceptance can destroy the reputations of falsely accused individuals, and, by failing to pay due attention to scientific evidence, gives credence to pseudoscience and demeans the scientific method. This paper was written to inform judges and attorneys about the relevant evidence, which shows that: (a) the concepts of repressed and recovered memory are not generally accepted in the psychological and psychiatric community; (b) the studies cited to support these concepts reveal significant flaws; (c) much empirical evidence has been accumulated against the theory of repression; (d) the studies using the best methodology offer the least support for the repression hypothesis; and (e) there is no evidence that recovered memories accurately reveal the specifics of long-ago events. Repressed- and recovered-memory theory is not supported by science.